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National policy advocates improving the economy by investing in U. S.
industrial competitiveness and encouraging technology transfer from defense to
U.S. commercial industry. National space policy emphasizes the need for assured
access to space. To achieve these objectives the Space Launch Modernization Plan
(SLMP) recommended four options. The option selected, investing $2 billion to
evolve existing technologies, will result in an Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle
(EELV) that:
1. Significantly reduces the annual recurring cost of launch (at least 25%
less than current systems with an objective of 50% reduction in the annual
cost of spacelift).
2. Consists of a family of vehicles that is technically achievable.
3. Uses a standard payload interface, standard launch platforms, and
infrastructure capable of launching all the configurations of EELV.
4. Launches safely, effectively, and responsively in accordance with long
range, deliberative, and reactive planning.
Cost reduction considerations dominates these requirements. Other
nontradeable parameters include Performance, Design Reliability, and
Standardization. To the extent that these primary objectives are achieved, the
other areas of responsiveness, timeliness, and supportability will be traded. This
paper will address the genesis of the EELV, the requirements trade space, and the
acquisition strategy employed to implement the SLMP recommendation.
GENESIS OF EELV
Space is becoming more critical in an information-dominated world. The
Department of Defense (DOD) needs the assured capability to routinely deploy
payloads or replenish on-orbit failures to meet peace and wartime requirements in a
very predictable timeframe. Without this capability on a day-to-day basis, space
assets may not adequately support our forces in crisis or war. Coincidentally, our
7-1
nation needs to lower the annual cost of spacelift to regain its world class
competitiveness. The genesis of the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle stems from
the Nation’s basic need to transport material into space and our inability to do so
economically. On 5 Aug 94 President Clinton directed the Air Force to improve and
evolve Expendable Launch Vehicles (ELVs) with the objective of reducing cost while
improving reliability, operability, responsiveness, and safety. Note that, although
the President identified several deficiencies in the way we perform spacelift, the key
deficiency is cost.
Space Launch Modernization Study
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 directed the
Secretary of Defense to develop a spacelift plan. The Space Launch Modernization
Plan (SLMP) was commissioned in response. The plan addressed requirements not
only for the Department of Defense, but for the nation as a whole.
The study noted a major shift in the tone of national policy. Past national
space policies were dominated by the theme of assured access to space. Current
space policy, to which the EELV program responds, acknowledges the importance of
assured access but stresses technology transfer from defense to U.S. commercial
industry and improving the Nation’s economy by investing in U.S. industrial
competitiveness. The Nation has been interested in modernizing our spacelift
capability, but the divergence in views and interests has prevented our ability to
reach consensus.
The national space community consists of defense, intelligence, civil, and
commercial sectors. The defense sector wants spacelift that is responsive, efficient,
and cost effective, with a focus on medium lift capability. The intelligence sector
needs highly reliable heavy lift capability. The civil sector focuses on lower cost
human spaceflight, scientific exploration, and earth sensing satellites. The
commercial sector currently emphasizes inexpensive, predominantly
geosynchronous spacelift capability and dependable launch schedules. Future
commercial spacelift requirements will include Low Earth Orbit constellations
requiring replenishing missions. To address these disparate needs the study team
established a process to capture the common set of requirements.
The study group recognized early on that they needed a means to define,
develop, and rank system requirements. They employed a Quality Function
Deployment (QFD) process that facilitated the development of a preliminary set of
requirements. This preliminary set represents the desires of all four sectors:
Capability, Operability, Economics, Mission Success, and Responsiveness.
The SLMP team developed four options keeping this set of requirements in
mind. The first option, to sustain existing launch systems with only minor
upgrades, would maintain the current fleet of launch systems indefinitely. NASA
would pursue a reusable technology program, in cooperation with DOD technology
investments, with the objective of reaching a shuttle replacement decision in 1999-
2000. The second option, to evolve current expendable launch systems, would fly
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out current contracts and then transition to an evolved expendable replacement.
NASA would pursue the same strategy as before. Option three, develop a new
expendable launch system, would replace current expendable and could potentially
replace the Space Shuttle with an entirely new expendable system designed to
correct deficiencies in current systems. Option four, develop a new reusable launch
system, would focus efforts on developing reusable technology and providing
demonstrations. These efforts would lead to a decision on building a prototype
system and producing a fleet of operational vehicles.
DOD Implementation
The implementation strategy calls for maintaining the current Medium
Launch Vehicle (MLV) and Heavy Launch Vehicle (HLV) expendable vehicles and
infrastructure of the U.S. ELV fleet until cost effective alternatives are available.
The DOD will lead the effort to evolve current expendable launch systems into a
replacement expendable system while NASA leads the technology effort for a new
reusable launch system. Consistent with the President’s policy, the DOD’s
immediate spacelift priority is the reduction of recurring costs--by a minimum of
25%. DOD intends to make other improvements in the common requirements set
within this constraint, creating a requirements trade space. The evolution of
current systems will be achieved by streamlining the acquisition process, increasing
the use of commercial products and practices, and minimizing requirements for
unique government specifications.
In order to more clearly define our Nation’s spacelift needs, a team of
representatives from NASA, DOD, CIA, Department of Commerce, and the
Department of Transportation, refined the preliminary requirements set developed
by the SLMP. The team, named the National Spacelift Requirements Working
Group, established definitions and measures for these requirements to resolve the
basic problem of common spacelift terminology. The group’s charter was to establish
specific measurable characteristics for all future spacelift systems. Among the most
important requirements are performance and reliability. Human transport, low
recurring costs, payload accommodations, responsiveness and schedule
dependability requirements are also important, but each of these characteristics are
not equally important for all applications. The group agreed that space lift systems
must be Capable, Operable, Reliable, and Economical (CORE) for all applications.
Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) adopted the CORE requirements in its Mission
Area Plan (MAP).
The Spacelift MAP determines the direction AFSPC must forge to meet its
assigned mission tasks. The current MAP defines the CORE requirements:
Capability: Capability is the extent to which a spacelift system meets
mission requirements of (a) accurate and sufficient performance to mission
orbit for a broad range of spacecraft; and (b) system capacity to sustain
needed launch rate.
Operability: Spacelift operability is the ability to respond quickly and
dependably to payload deployment requirements, i.e. responsiveness.
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Reliability: Reliability is a measure of the ability of the spacelift system to
successfully accomplish its intended mission once that mission is initiated.
Economic: Economics is a measure of the acceptability of mission and life-
cycle costs of spacelift systems.
The MAP goes on to evaluate the mission area and identify key deficiencies.
Not surprisingly, the plan listed the greatest deficiency as the high recurring and
Operations and Maintenance (O&M) costs of launch vehicles and infrastructure. In
order resolve this deficiency, AFSPC authored a Mission Need Statement (MNS).
The Spacelift MNS formalized the SLMP findings and put the National Policy
directive into the acquisition cycle.
REQUIREMENTS TRADE SPACE
The Operational Requirements Document (ORD) specifies AFSPC’s
requirements for the EELV. In general terms, we want to launch our payloads
safely and effectively while reducing costs at least 25%. The major cost reduction is
expected to result from increased production rates (production efficiencies and
throughput), and lower operating costs due to reduced manpower and improved
standardization in space launch infrastructure. The system envisioned consists of a
family of vehicles using a standard payload interface, standard launch platforms,
and an infrastructure compatible with all the configurations of EELV. We need to
launch responsively whether as result of long range, deliberative planning, or in
reaction to a crisis.
More specifically, there are three non-tradable or “key” parameters the
system must achieve and 22 other parameters that can be optimized within a trade
space. The intent is to balance cost reduction with improvements. At a minimum,
the new system must perform at least as well as current systems and cost 25% less.
The key parameters are performance, design reliability, and standardization:
Performance: The ability to deliver required mass to orbit at the best cost
effectiveness. EELV must, at a minimum, be able to deliver the DOD
portion of the National Mission Model to orbit. As an objective EELV
should deliver the DOD portion of the National Mission model with a 15%
performance margin.
Design Reliability: Design reliability is defined as the ability to complete
the spacelift mission, from launch to payload separation (including a collision
avoidance maneuver), at a success rate to sustain constellations. EELV must
achieve at least .98 design reliability y in order to sustain our constellations in
a steady state. The objective is to gain the highest reliability y we can
reasonably afford.
Standardization: The maximum use of common infrastructure, equipment,
and processes for launch vehicles, facilities, pads, and payload interfaces. At
a minimum, each pad and its facilities must be able to process and launch all
configurations of EELV, the vehicle family must employ a standard interface
to all payloads, and the support concept must encompass standard operations
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processes and standard logistics. The objective is to standardize these
components to the extent that cost savings and operability goals are
maximized.
The remaining 22 parameters can be grouped either according to the
underlying CORE requirement or simply as a constraint. In addition to
performance, the characteristics that describe “Capable” include launch
performance margin, orbital performance accuracy, launch rate, payload
separation, and design flexibility. The characteristics that pertain to “Operable,”
along with Standardization, include efficient ground processing, resilience,
supportability, hold requirements, launch abort, launch recycle, post-launch
operations, and recovery & disposal. Design reliability describes “Reliable” and
Cost savings captures “Economical.” The remaining five parameters (logistics &
readiness, safety, launch environment, environmental, and payload considerations)
are constraints.
ACQUISITION STRATEGY
The EELV development program represents an investment of $2 billion to
significantly reduce the cost of launch. Consistent with the trend to build a strong
partnership with industry through streamlining and reforming acquisition, the
program manages risk, applies process controls from other industries to spacelift,
and minimizes oversight and reviews by replacing them with processes where
quality is designed in. In Dec 94 an Integrated Product Team (IPT) was formed to
examine innovative acquisition approaches currently being used by programs
throughout the Air Force. The IPT forged the acquisition approach after reviewing
111 innovative acquisition approaches in the management, technical, contracting,
and financial areas.
Contractor innovation and adequate Government visibility into contractor
performance is achieved without costly and unnecessary oversight requirements. A
single manager with the responsibility, authority, and accountability necessary for
program execution reports through a streamlined management structure. This
structure contains only three layers of management - the program manager, the
Program Executive Officer, and Service Acquisition Executive.
In keeping with the Acquisition Reform Mandate of 1994, the program office
is using commercial practices and streamlining to the maximum extent possible.
The program is using performance specifications and non-Government standards in
lieu of military specifications and standards, unless no practical alternative exists.
Each contractor is identifying specifications, Government or commercial, they
believe to be most compatible with their concept and able to meet the Government
requirements. The program office is streamlining internal briefing cycles and
supplying only the documentation needed to meet statutory requirements or for the
staff to meet their responsibilities. For instance, the acquisition and management
approach is being documented in a document entitled the Single Acquisition and
Management Plan (SAMP). This document describes the EELV program and
incorporates many of the traditional documents and briefings into a single
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document without being redundant, having to reformat the information, or
including superfluous material. The program itself consists of three phases: Low
Cost Concept Validation (LCCV), Pre-Engineering & Manufacturing Development
(Pre-EMD), and EMD.
Low Cost Concept Validation (LCCV)
Since Aug 95, the EELV program has been in the 15 month Low Cost
Concept Validation (LCCV) phase. Each of the four contractors participating in the
low risk LCCV phase manage $30 million of resources (material, test, facilities, and
personnel) to meet the LCCV module objectives. All four contractors are defining
system concepts, mitigating risk by trade analyses and demonstrations, drafting
system design specifications, and selecting potential launch base facilities. Each
contractor held a Tailored System Requirements Review (TSRR) in Dec 95 and each
will hold a Tailored Preliminary Design Review (TPDR) prior to the downselect for
the next phase in Aug 1996.
Pre-Engineering & Manufacturing Development (Pre-EMD)
The Pre-Engineering, Manufacturing, and Development (EMD) phase begins
in the first quarter of FY97 and will last for 17 months. Two contracts will be
awarded for this module for an estimated $65 million each. Competition will be
limited to LCCV contractors. In the Pre EMD phase the two winning contractors
will complete system product designs, ensure the system designs meet
requirements, verify producibility and processes, and verify affordability
improvements.
Engineering & Manufacturing Development (EMD)
After Pre-EMD one contractor will be awarded an anticipated $1.5 billion to
enter the 8 year EMD phase. Competition will again be limited, this time to the
two Pre-EMD contractors. The winning contractor will reach full manufacturing
capability, complete site activation, and perform Low Risk Payload Flights (LRPFs)
for both medium and heavy lift variants. Since a major issue for any new program
is maintaining schedule, the emphasis will be on the program meeting a
demonstrated capability prior to the actual IOC need. Two medium LRPFs are
planned to occur in FYOO and one heavy LRPF in FY03. The Defense
Meteorological Satellite Program Flight 16 and TSX, an Air Force Material
Command scientific payload, have been proposed as payloads for the two medium
LRPFs. An MLV full rate production decision will be made early in this module to
satisfy the scheduled launch requirements. The module will conclude when Initial
Operational Capability (IOC) is declared for both Medium and Heavy Lift Variants.
Although not fully defined, IOC is an event to be declared by AFSPC after
consideration of the readiness of major functions such as launch processing
capability, completion of site activation, and completion of all production and
acceptance test activities for the vehicle and the system. IOC for medium lift is
projected to occur in FYO1, and IOC for heavy lift is projected to occur in FY05.
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CONCLUSION
The Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle Program is the Nation’s latest effort
to regain control of its launch capability. While previous programs have risen and
fallen, the old die-bards Delta, Atlas, and Titan have continued to provide for our
Nation’s spacelift. We are no longer interested in an engineer’s dream machine, but
rather an accountant’s tally. The EELV program resulted from soul-searching
begun in the Space Launch Modernization Study, perpetuated itself as Air Force
Space Commands mission need, and continues as the program office employs
innovative approaches to streamline the acquisition process. The sensible thing to
do is to fly out existing systems while evolving these same systems into a family of
launch vehicles. The goal is not only to meet the 25% cost reduction target, but to
improve the CORE requirements--Capable, Operable, Reliable, and Economical.
The program is on a fast tack with three continuously competitive phases with MLV
operations slated for FY02 and HLV operations in FY05. The program represents
the Nation’s commitment to provide economical access to space.
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